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Bayesian Statistical Pragmatism
Andrew Gelman
I agree with Rob Kass’ point that we can and
should make use of statistical methods developed
under different philosophies, and I am happy to take
the opportunity to elaborate on some of his argu-
ments.
FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY
Kass describes probability theory as anchored upon
physical randomization (coin flips, die rolls and the
like) but being useful more generally as a mathe-
matical model. I completely agree but would also
add another anchoring point: calibration. Calibra-
tion of probability assessments is an objective, not
subjective process, although some subjectivity (or
scientific judgment) is necessarily involved in the
choice of events used in the calibration. In that way,
Bayesian probability calibration is closely connected
to frequentist probability statements, in that both
are conditional on “reference sets” of comparable
events. We discuss these issues further in Chapter 1
of Bayesian Data Analysis, featuring examples from
sports betting and record linkage.
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS AND
HYPOTHESIS TESTS
I agree with Kass that confidence and statistical
significance are “valuable inferential tools.” They
are treated differently in classical and Bayesian statis-
tics, however. In the Neyman–Pearson theory of in-
ference, confidence and statistical significance are
two sides of the same coin, with a confidence in-
terval being the set of parameter values not rejected
by a significance test. Unfortunately, this approach
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falls apart (or, at the very least, is extremely dif-
ficult) in problems with high-dimensional parame-
ter spaces that are characteristic of my own applied
work in social science and environmental health.
In a modern Bayesian approach, confidence in-
tervals and hypothesis testing are both important
but are not isomorphic; they represent two different
steps of inference. Confidence statements, or poste-
rior intervals, are summaries of inference about pa-
rameters conditional on an assumed model. Hypoth-
esis testing—or, more generally, model checking—is
the process of comparing observed data to replica-
tions under the model if it were true. Statistically
significance in a hypothesis test corresponds to some
aspect of the data which would be unexpected un-
der the model. For Bayesians, as for other statistical
researchers, both these steps of inferences are im-
portant: we want to make use of the mathematics of
probability to make conditionally valid statements
about unobserved quantities, and we also want to
make use of this same probability theory to reveal
areas in which our models do not fit the data.
SAMPLING
Kass discusses the role of sampling as a model for
understanding statistical inference. But sampling is
more than a metaphor; it is crucial in many aspects
of statistics. This is evident in analysis of public
opinion and health, where analyses rely on random-
sample national surveys, and in environmental statis-
tics, where continuous physical variables are studied
using space-time samples. But even in areas where
sampling is less apparent, it can be important. Con-
sider medical experiments, where the object invari-
ably is inference for the general population, not mere-
ly for the patients in the study. Similarly, the goal
of Kass and his colleagues in their neuroscience re-
search is to learn about general aspects of human
and animal brains, not merely to study the partic-
ular creatures on which they have data. Ultimately,
sample is just another word for subset, and in both
Bayesian and classical inference, appropriate gen-
eralization from sample to population depends on
a model for the sampling or selection process. I have
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no problem with Kass’ use of sampling as a frame-
work for inference, and I think this will work even
better if he emphasizes the generalization from real
samples to real populations—not just mathemati-
cal constructs—that are central to so much of our
applied inferences.
SUBJECTIVITY AND BELIEF
The only two statements in Kass’ article that I
clearly disagree with are the following two claims:
“the only solid foundation for Bayesianism is sub-
jective,” and “the most fundamental belief of any
scientist is that the theoretical and real worlds are
aligned.” I will discuss the two statements in turn.
Claims of the subjectivity of Bayesian inference
have been much debated, and I am under no il-
lusion that I can resolve them here. But I will re-
peat my point made at the outset of this discussion
that Bayesian probability, like frequentist probabil-
ity, is except in the simplest of examples a model-
based activity that is mathematically anchored by
physical randomization at one end and calibration
to a reference set at the other. I will also repeat
the familiar, but true, argument1 that most of the
power of a Bayesian inference typically comes from
the likelihood, not the prior, and a person who is re-
ally worried about subjective model-building might
profitably spend more effort thinking about assump-
tions inherent in additive models, logistic regres-
sions, proportional hazards models, and the like.
Even the Wilcoxon test is based on assumptions!
To put it another way, I will accept the idea of sub-
jective Bayesianism when this same subjectivity is
acknowledged for other methods of inference. Until
that point, I prefer to speak not of “subjectivity”
but of “assumptions” and “scientific judgment.” I
agree with Kass that scientists and statisticians can
and should feel free to make assumptions without
falling into a “solipsistic quagmire.”
Finally, I am surprised to see Kass write that sci-
entists believe that the theoretical and real worlds
are aligned. It is from acknowledging the discrepan-
cies between these worlds that we can (a) feel free to
make assumptions without being paralyzed by fear
of making mistakes, and (b) feel free to check the
1As a friend remarked to me in tenth-grade English class,
“I don’t know why they don’t want us to use cliche´s. These
sayings are cliche´s because they’re true!”
fit of our models (those hypothesis tests again! Al-
though I prefer graphical model checks, supplanted
by p-values as necessary). All models are false, etc.
I assume that Kass is using the word “aligned” in
a loose sense, to imply that scientists believe that
their models are appropriate to reality even if not
fully correct. But I would not even want to go that
far. Often in my own applied work I have used mod-
els that have clear flaws, models that are at best
“phenomenological” in the sense of fitting the data
rather than corresponding to underlying processes of
interest—and often such models do not fit the data
so well either.2 But these models can still be use-
ful: they are still a part of statistics and even a part
of science (to the extent that science includes data
collection and description as well as deep theories).
DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF STATISTICS
Like Kass, I believe that philosophical debates can
be a good thing, if they motivate us to think care-
fully about our unexamined assumptions. Perhaps
even the existence of subfields that rarely communi-
cate with each other has been a source of progress
in allowing different strands of research to be de-
veloped in a pluralistic environment, in a way that
might not have been so easily done if statistical com-
munication had been dominated by any single intol-
erant group. Ideas of sampling, inference, and model
checking are important in many different statistical
traditions and we are lucky to have so many differ-
ent ideas on which to draw for inspiration in our
applied and methodological research.
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2In the annals of hack literature, it is sometimes said that
if you aim to write best-selling crap, all you will end up with
is crap. To truly produce best-selling crap, you have to have
a conviction, perhaps misplaced, that your writing has in-
tegrity. Whether or not this is a good generalization about
writing, I have seen an analogous phenomenon in statistics:
If you try to do nothing but model the data, you can be in
for a wild and unpleasant ride: real data always seem to have
one more twist beyond our ability to model (von Neumann’s
elephant’s trunk notwithstanding). But if you model the un-
derlying process, sometimes your model can fit surprisingly
well as well as inviting openings for future research progress.
